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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH 
CODE ANN.( 1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff, Appellant and Cross-Appellee Carol Christiansen submits this brief in 
response to the cross-appeal of Appellee and Cross-Appellant Union Pacific Railroad 
Company.1 Union Pacific asks this Court to reverse the trial court's finding that: 
After reviewing the record in this matter, and viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the 
Court is persuaded plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to 
create a duty and show a breach of that duty.2 
The issue for decision is thus whether Christiansen has submitted sufficient 
evidence to enable the trier of fact to conclude he was exposed to asbestos-containing 
products for which defendant is legally responsible. 
Under the laws of Utah, a trial court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment 
is generally given plenary review under the "correction of error" standard. In this case, 
however, Union Pacific's cross-appeal is premised on its evidentiary contention that the 
1
 Union Pacific's arguments in support of its cross-appeal are set forth in Section II 
of its brief, and its rebuttal to Christiansen's appeal is set forth in Section I. Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee hereby replies to Union Pacific's response set forth as Section I and 
responds to Union Pacific's Cross Appeal as Section II herein. 
2
 Memo. Decision of 4/29/04, R. 885, at 887. This Court need only reach this issue 
if it agrees with appellant Christiansen that his claims against Union Pacific should not 
have been dismissed because they are timely. 
1 
trial court erroneously admitted and considered the affidavit of plaintiff s expert Kenneth 
Cohen, whose testimony supports Christiansen's theory of negligence.3 That evidentiary 
ruling is entitled to deference, and should only be reversed if this Court determines that 
admission of the Cohen Affidavit constituted an abuse of discretion. See Ostler v. Albina 
Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah App. 1989) ("The general rule regarding the 
admission or exclusion of evidence is that the trial court's decision will not be overturned 
in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation]"); In re General Determination of Use 
of Water..., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999) ("In civil cases such as the present one, where 
the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise concerns of the type that have 
produced heightened standards of sensitivity,4 a trial court decision to admit evidence is 
reviewed under a broad grant of discretion.") 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
The parties agree that Union Pacific's liability is governed by the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 etseq. ("FELA"). 
3
 See Brief of Appellee at 47. 
4
 The court is referring to criminal cases, where admission of evidence may 
involve Fourth Amendment issues, or where the evidence (such as gruesome 
photographs) has a high potential for prejudice. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Christiansen's Exposure To Asbestos At Union Pacific 
Christiansen worked for Union Pacific Railroad in 1951 and 1952. (R. 565.) His 
primary jobs as a machinist and a machinist's helper involved rebuilding old steam 
engines (referred to as "Mallies") in the back shops and the roundhouse at Union 
Pacific's Pocatello, Idaho railroad yard. (R. 563-65.) This work exposed him to both 
sheet asbestos and asbestos mud. For example, when asked to describe the work he did 
on the Mallies, Christiansen testified: 
Everything from taking the metal off the outside of the boilers 
and piling it, and rebricking the inside of the boilers, the 
firebox. * * * [Yjou'd always stripped [sic] the insulation. 
You'd strip all the asbestos off and put new asbestos on it. 
(R. 571, 572.) 
Christiansen sawed and drilled through sheets of asbestos in order to make them fit 
around the locomotive fireboxes. (R. 563.) He also performed a job known as "cellar 
packing" which involved packing journal boxes with asbestos and rags. (R. 564.) The 
asbestos mud he used for the packing was delivered in a powder form that he was obliged 
to pour into a container and mix with water. (R. 573.) Christiansen believes that his one 
year of work at Union Pacific exposed him to some of the most significant levels of 
asbestos that he encountered in his career. (R. 574.)5 
5
 It is undisputed that Christiansen suffers from asbestosis. The relevant facts 
regarding his diagnosis and treatment are summarized in the Statement of Facts section of 
Appellant's Opening Brief. 
3 
B. Union Pacific's Knowledge Of The Risks Of Asbestos 
The facts establishing Union Pacific's knowledge of the risks that asbestos posed 
to employees such as Christiansen were submitted to the trial court through the Affidavit 
of Kenneth Cohen (R. 585-600). Mr. Cohen is a Certified Industrial Hygienist with 
"extensive experience consulting on workplace asbestos exposure levels and abatement 
procedures within the industry, including ... railroad yards and repair facilities." (Cohen 
Aff Iflf 1, 2, R. 586.) His research confirms that during the period Christiansen worked at 
Union Pacific, "the steam lines, valves, and boilers in the cabs of steam locomotives were 
heavily insulated with asbestos containing materials." (Id. % 8, R. 587.) Based on his 
review of asbestos material handling procedures, Cohen opines "it is more likely than not 
that the number of airborne asbestos fibers released during overhaul [of steam 
locomotives] would measure in the range of between of [sic] 5 to 100 fibers per cubic 
centimeter." (Id. \ 12, R. 588.) 
Regarding Union Pacific's knowledge of the risks, Cohen unequivocally states: 
As early as the mid 1930s, the American Association of 
Railroads was aware of the health hazards associated with 
exposure to asbestos, and even made recommendations for 
control practices at that time. 
All of the major railroad companies, including Union Pacific, 
were members of the American Association of Railroads, and 
were privy to this information. 
In fact, J.R. Nillson, the Chief Surgeon for Union Pacific 
Railroad, sat on the American Association of Railroad's 
Medical Committee at the time these recommendations were 
made. 
4 
(Cohen Aff Tffl 16-18, R. 589 [emph. added].) Union Pacific has not introduced any 
evidence to dispute those facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT RELATED TO CROSS APPEAL 
A plaintiff in a FELA action is entitled to go to the jury on his causation claims so 
long as there is "evidence that any employer negligence caused the harm, or, more 
precisely, enough to justify a jury's determination that employer negligence had played 
any role in producing the harm." Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 372 U.S. 108, 
116, 83 S.Ct. 659, 664 (1963) (emph. added). Because of the strong worker protection 
policies underlying FELA, "a trial court is justified in withdrawing ... issue[s] from the 
jury's consideration only in those extremely rare instances where there is a zero 
probability either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the 
injury of an employee." Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 430 F.2d 697, 699-700 (3d 
Cir. 1970) (emph. added). 
The trial court found the testimony summarized above sufficient to raise material 
questions of fact as to whether Union Pacific breached its duty to protect its employees, 
including Christiansen, from the substantial risks of exposure to asbestos in the railroad 
workplace. That finding should be affirmed because the record contains persuasive 
evidence that the jobs plaintiff was required to perform for Union Pacific exposed him to 
asbestos fibers; that plaintiff is suffering from the foreseeable health effects of that 
exposure; and that Union Pacific knew of, but failed to protect plaintiff from, those health 
risks. 
5 
SECTION I RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. Summary Judgment May Not Be Granted In FELA Cases Unless 
There Is No Admissible Evidence That The Employer's Negligence 
Played Any Part In Causing The Employee's Injuries 
FELA is a "broad remedial statute" enacted for the "humanitarian purpose" of 
protecting the nation's railroad workers. Handy v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 841 P.2d 
1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The U. S. Supreme Court has, accordingly, mandated a 
"standard of liberal construction" which entitles an employee to recover under FELA so 
long as "the employees negligence 'played any part, even the slightest, in producing the 
injury or death for which damages are sought.'" Id., quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. 
R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448 (1957).6 
This "lighter burden of proof' affects not only the employee's burden of proof at 
trial, but also his burden on summary judgment. Holbrook v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 
414 F.3d 739, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2005); see generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 411 U.S. 
242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (in evaluating a summary judgment motion, "the 
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary 
burden...."). "By enacting FELA, Congress desired to 'secure jury determinations in a 
6
 See also Gallick, supra, 372 U.S. at 116; Hines v. Consolidated Rail 
Corporation, 926 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 1991). As noted in Pehowic, "the Supreme 
Court has made it abundantly clear that it will summarily reverse when this standard has 
not been applied." (430 F.2d at 699 n.2.) 
6 
larger proportion of cases than would be true of ordinary common law actions.5 
[Citations]" Hines, supra, 926 F.2d at 269. Thus, summary dismissal of a plaintiff s claim 
in a FELA action is a rare occurrence which is only justified when plaintiff has failed to 
come forward with any admissible evidence to support his contentions. 
II. Union Pacific Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment In This Case 
Because Christiansen's Evidence Is Sufficient To Enable The Trier Of 
Fact To Conclude That Union Pacific Negligently Exposed Him To 
Hazardous Levels Of Asbestos 
In reviewing a party's motion for summary judgment, the court is obliged to 
construe all of the relevant facts and information in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party - here, plaintiff Christiansen. Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 
P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
"[BJecause of the peculiar nature of asbestos products and the development of disease due 
to exposure to such products," the inquiry in asbestos liability cases is particularly fact-
intensive. Lockwoodv.AC&S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d235, 744P.2d 605, 613 (Wash. 
1987). In this case, summary judgment cannot be granted because Christiansen has 
presented evidence that, construed most favorably to him, Union Pacific negligently 
exposed him to hazardous levels of asbestos which caused or contributed to his injuries. 
A. Christiansen Presented A Prima Facie Case That He Was 
Exposed To Hazardous Levels Of Asbestos In The Course Of His 
Employment At Union Pacific 
Christiansen testified that his work at Union Pacific exposed him to various types 
of asbestos, and he is suffering from asbestosis. Union Pacific presents no facts which 
7 
might refute that testimony, but attempts to disparage it by quoting selected deposition 
excerpts in which the questions posed to Christiansen, and his responses, were phrased in 
terms of his "belief that he was exposed.7 Read in context, however, the witness5 
responses are unequivocal on the fact that removing and replacing asbestos insulation was 
one of his main assignments, and occurred on a regular basis. {E.g., R. 584.) If Union 
Pacific has information tending to refute Christiansen's recollection of his job duties, it is 
free to use it to attempt to contradict him at trial. 
B. Christiansen Presented A Prima Facie Case That Union Pacific 
Knew Of, But Failed To Protect Him Against, The Hazards Of 
Asbestos In Its Workplace 
The extent of an employer's actual and imputed knowledge of the risks of its 
workplace is a question of fact. Christiansen's evidence in opposition to Union Pacific's 
summary judgment motion, which must be construed in his favor, is sufficient to raise a 
triable issue as to whether Union Pacific breached its duty to provide him a safe 
workplace. 
7
 This semantic argument is at odds with Union Pacific's position on the statute of 
limitations issue which Christiansen has appealed. In Section I of its brief, Union Pacific 
insists that Christiansen's previous "belief that his health problems might be related to 
his work with asbestos obligated him to bring suit earlier, despite the fact that his 
suspicions were not only unconfirmed, but had been dismissed by his doctors. Here, 
Union Pacific argues that Christiansen's "mere belief he was exposed to asbestos 
products is insufficient to raise a question of fact. (UP Brief at 46) Such two-faced 
posturing has been expressly condemned by the courts. See Shesler v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 784 N.E.2d 725,738 (Ohio App. 2003) (" it is ironic that the [defendant] first 
argues that the [plaintiff] could not personally identify asbestos or asbestos-containing 
materials, but now, [the defendant] argues that [he] should have possessed the knowledge 
necessary to identify not only asbestos but resulting injuries.") 
8 
1. Union Pacific Is Presumed To Know The Risks And Hazards Of 
The Asbestos Materials It Provided To Its Employees 
Although an employer is not strictly liable for all injuries that may befall its 
employees, it may not avoid liability by closing its eyes to the known risks of its 
enterprise. Thus, "[an employer] is presumed to know the nature and quality of the 
materials he places in the hands of his servants," and "he is presumed to have such 
knowledge of matters pertaining to his business as is possessed by those having special 
acquaintance with the subjects involved." Mitchell v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 244 
N.E.2d406, 411 (111. App. 1968); see Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 179-80, 69 S.Ct. 
1018, 1030 (1949) (Railroad liable for injuries caused by employee's exposure to silica 
dust where, "Defendant created the place in which the work was done and supervised the 
doing of the work by plaintiff and was aware for a period of at least sixteen years of the 
conditions under which plaintiff was required to work and of the means and methods by 
which its work was accomplished;'); cf. O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291 (8th 
Cir. 1967) ("A manufacturer is held to the skill of an expert in its particular field of 
endeavor," and its duty to warn users of the potential danger of its product "is 
commensurate with its actual knowledge of the risk involved to those users or the 
knowledge constructively imparted to it by available scientific or other medical data. 
[citation omitted, emphasis added].") 
FELA holds common carriers to an especially high level of accountability, such 
that "if an employee is injured because the railroad has failed to provide a safe place to 
9 
work, the railroad breached its duty and may be held liable for any foreseeable harm." 
Rogers, supra, 352 U.S. at 506, 77 S.Ct. at 448; Handy, supra, 841 P.2d at 1218. To 
establish that a railroad breached its duty to provide a safe workplace, the plaintiff need 
only show "'circumstances which a reasonable person would foresee as creating a 
potential for harm.' [Citation]" Holbrook, supra, 414 F.3d at 742. Applying those 
standards, ample precedent exists for imposing liability on defendant railroads on the 
ground that the industry was aware of, but failed adequately to protect its workers from, 
the risks of working with and around asbestos. See, e.g., Wingo v. Celotex Corporation, 
834 F.2d 375, 376-77 (4th Cir. 1987) (jury finding that N & W Railway "knew of the 
hazard that its employees' exposure to asbestos dust could cause lung disease; that it knew 
of measures to prevent harmful exposure of its employees to asbestos dust and knew that 
such measures should be used; that it failed to maintain a reasonably safe place to work; 
... and that it failed to eliminate or control dust exposure hazards"); Dale v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co., 552 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. 1989) (plaintiff pipefitter who, like 
Christiansen, removed asbestos insulation from steam locomotives, was entitled to a jury 
trial on the issue whether the railroad knew or should have known that the exposure to 
asbestos dust occasioned by plaintiffs employment would have caused the injury from 
which he suffered). 
Because Union Pacific used asbestos products and asbestos-containing equipment 
and required Christiansen to work with those products, it is presumed to have known of 
10 
the dangerous propensities associated with those materials.8 Given that knowledge, the 
company should have taken steps to significantly reduce or eliminate asbestos exposure to 
its employees. There is no evidence that it did so. 
2. Cohen's Affidavit Raises A Triable Issue As To Whether Union 
Pacific Knew Of, And Negligently Failed To Protect Plaintiff 
Against, The Risks Of Working With Asbestos 
The affidavit of Christiansen's expert, Kenneth Cohen, confirms the likelihood 
that Christiansen's railroad work exposed him to asbestos,9 and also establishes that 
Union Pacific was aware of the dangers and risks of asbestos exposure during the time 
period Christiansen worked there. That evidence is competent, relevant and admissible, 
and it was certainly not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit and consider it.10 
8
 Note that Christiansen is not required to prove that Union Pacific's practices fell 
below the standards customary in the industry. This point was put to rest in Urie, wherein 
the Supreme Court stated: "[N]egligence, within the meaning of the FELA, attached if 
respondent [railroad] 'knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,' that 
prevalent standards of conduct were inadequate to protect petitioner and similarly situated 
employees." 337 U.S. at 178. 
9
 Third-party testimony is relevant and admissible on the issue of exposure. See 
Lockwood, supra, 744 P.2d at 612 (because of difficulties caused by long latency periods, 
memory loss, and exposure to multiple products, plaintiff in an asbestos injury case may 
rely on the testimony of others to identify the products to which he was exposed at his 
workplace). 
10
 See Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 2001)("The qualifications of a 
person as an expert witness is in the discretion of the trial court. [Citation]"); Gallegos ex 
rel Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 110 P.3d 710, 713 (Ut. App. 2004) (trial courts 
have broad discretion to determine whether expert evidence is sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted). 
11 
Union Pacific challenges the trial court's decision to admit Cohen's testimony on 
the ground that it "contains conclusory opinions ... that are made without adequate 
foundation." (UP Brief at 47.) That challenge is not meritorious, because the affidavit 
meets the requirements of Utah R.Civ. P. 56(e). To be admissible under the statute, an 
affidavit must "be made on personal knowledge of the affiant, and set forth facts that 
would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). A 
witness testifying as an expert is, however, entitled to base his or her opinion on facts 
which are not in the record, or even on inadmissible evidence (such as hearsay), so long 
as "they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the witness' field of expertise." 
Utah Rule of Evidence 703; Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 
1984); Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (West Virginia), 111 N.E.2d 1110, 1120 (Ind. App. 2002) 
(construing identical Indiana rule.) An expert's knowledge need not, moreover, be based 
on personal observations of the plaintiff or the site of injury, but "may be acquired 
through hands-on experience, formal education, specialized training, study of textbooks, 
performing experiments, and observation." Vaughn, 111 N.E.2d at 1120. The courts 
recognize that expert testimony is often based on variables which are inherently uncertain, 
but hold that such uncertainty is not, in itself, a reason to exclude it. See Board of 
Education of Salt Lake City v. Bothwell and Swaner Company, 400 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 
1965). 
12 
In his affidavit and accompanying curriculum vitae, Cohen attests to his 
considerable experience working in the fields of industrial hygiene and occupational 
health and, in particular, his expertise in asbestos issues. He states that his conclusions 
are based on tests and inspections that he himself conducted of railroad yards, 
roundhouses, and locomotives fl[ 3); on his studies of "how asbestos is released into the 
air and how it behaves in air once released (f 2); and on his monitoring of employees at 
railroad yards and other facilities fl[ 1). His investigations confirm Christiansen's 
testimony that "the railroads used asbestos extensively" (f 3) and that during the period 
1941-1981 (which encompasses Christiansen's work for Union Pacific), "the steam lines, 
valves, and boilers in the cabs of steam locomotives were heavily insulated with asbestos 
containing materials" (f 8). Based on his "review of asbestos material handling 
procedures, at roundhouses" such as where Christiansen worked, he estimates that "it is 
more likely than not that the number of airborne asbestos fibers released during overhaul 
would measure in the range of between ... 5 to 100 fibers per cubic centimeter" fl[ 12). 
Given that it is impossible for anyone now to observe the operations of Union Pacific as 
they were conducted 50 years ago, such historic research - combined with Christiansen's 
testimony- is the best available evidence of the levels of asbestos to which Christiansen 
was likely exposed.11 
11
 This is especially true where, as here, the creation and production of records 
documenting the details of plaintiff s jobs and working conditions are in the exclusive 
control of his employer. See Christiansen's Memo, in Opposition to Union Pacific's 
13 
Cohen also has reviewed and is thus competent to testify as an expert about the 
notes and reports of the American Association of Railroad's medical committee regarding 
asbestos exposure. (Cohen Affidavit f 16) That evidence is especially relevant because 
Union Pacific's Chief Surgeon sat on the Association's medical committee in the mid-
1930s, when the health hazards of asbestos were recognized and control practices 
recommended, flffl 17, 18) 
This case is strikingly similar in this regard to Dale v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Co., 552 A.2d 1Q37 (Pa. 1989J.12 Plaintiff in that FELA action was the widow of a 
deceased pipefitter for B&O Railroad. Like Christiansen, plaintiff claimed his lung 
disease resulted from his removal of asbestos insulation from steam locomotives during 
the period 1945-1955. The opinion reveals that, 
[Plaintiff] introduced evidence as to the nature of his 
exposure to asbestos on the job; medical opinion that his 
disability was caused by asthma and asbestosis; expert 
opinion indicating that from the 1930!s through the 1950's 
there was a substantial body of medical literature indicating 
that asbestos dust was a hazard to employees; and evidence 
that between 1932 and 1955 an organization to which 
[defendant railroad] belonged, the Association of American 
Railroads, published in its minutes of its annual meetings 
Motion for Summary Judgment at R.547, pointing out that "Although Union Pacific 
would be in control of documents such as Mr. Christiansen's employment records, to date 
it has failed to produce these records." 
12
 Although Dale has been "red-flagged" due to subsequent disagreement with that 
portion of the opinion which deals with the apportionment of plaintiff s damages, the 
relevant portions of the decision are still good law. 
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various discussions of the hazards to health of dust generated 
by industrial activities. 
(552 A.2d at 1038.) The Court of Appeal judged it reversible error not to admit that 
evidence, which concerns the very same reports to which the Cohen Affidavit refers. 
Ott v. Allied Signal Inc., 827 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. App. 2005) is another case where 
the trial court was determined to have wrongfully excluded plaintiffs expert affidavits 
against defendant asbestos manufacturers. Like Union Pacific herein, defendants urged 
the court to reject the affidavits because two of them "were prepared for different 
litigation," and because none of them specifically discussed the decedent. (827 N.E.2d at 
1149.) 
The appellate court rejected those contentions. It found that the affidavits, which 
were intended to provide "general background information regarding the etiology of 
asbestos-related cancers," were competent and should have been admitted because, 
This information, which explains the disease process 
applicable to all victims of asbestos-related cancer, including 
[decedent's], is ... relevant in that it makes facts of 
consequence to the determination of the action more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
(827 N.E.2d at 1150.) The court held that while the experts' lack of familiarity with 
decedent's particular case might be relevant to the reliability {i.e., the weight) of their 
testimony, such reliability issues are questions of fact. Accord, Green v. Louder, supra, 
29 P.3d at 645-46 ("The opposing party may challenge the suitability or reliability of 
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[admitted expert opinion] on cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight to 
be given the testimony, not to its admissibility. [Citation omitted, emphasis in original]." 
In Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., supra, defendant ConRail challenged the 
affidavit of expert Dr. Shubin, who attested to the probability that plaintiffs' injuries were 
caused by workplace exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Shubin's 
conclusions were based on his examination of plaintiffs and their medical records and, 
like Cohen's, on "numerous published studies and reports" including information from 
the EPA. (926 F.2d at 266-67.) The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of 
ConRail on the ground the trial court's rejection of the affidavit amounted to an abuse of 
discretion, and violated the liberal standards of FELA. The trial court here properly 
avoided that pitfall; its decision to admit the Cohen Affidavit, and its conclusion that 
whether or not Union Pacific breached its duty of care in this case presents triable 
questions of fact, was well within the bounds of its discretion, and should be affirmed. 
SECTION I REPLY 
Plaintiff, Appellant and Cross-Appellee Carol Christiansen submits this Reply to 
the new issues raised by Appellee and Cross-Appellant Union Pacific Railway Company. 
Summary judgment cannot be granted because material questions of fact exist as to when 
Christiansen could and "should" have discovered he was suffering from occupationally-
caused asbestos disease. Christiansen's undisputed evidence that his doctors initially 
attributed his ailments to "congestion;" that he was not diagnosed with lung disease 
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(pulmonary fibrosis) until 1999; and that he was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 2002; 
is sufficient to entitle him to present his claims to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Summary Judgment Should Only Be Affirmed If This Court Concludes 
There Is No Admissible Evidence That Christiansen's Suit Was Timely 
Because FELA is a "broad, remedial statute5' expressly intended to protect injured 
railroad workers like Christiansen, it must be liberally applied and construed. Rogers v. 
Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448 (1957); Urie v. Thompson, 337 
U.S. 163, 180-81, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1030 (1949); Handy v. Union Pacific Railroad Co,, 841 
P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The hurdles for a defendant seeking summary 
judgment in a FELA action are, accordingly, especially high: "By enacting FELA, 
Congress desired to 'secure jury determinations in a larger proportion of cases than would 
be true of ordinary common law actions.' [Citations]." Hines v. Consolidated Rail 
Corporation, 926 F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus, dismissal of a plaintiff s claim in a 
FELA action is a rare occurrence which is only justified when plaintiff fails to come 
forward with any admissible evidence to support his contentions. See Rogers, supra, 352 
U.S. 500 at 506, 77 S.Ct. 443 at 448. "With this lighter burden of proof, a plaintiff can 
more easily survive a motion for summary judgment. [Citation]." Holbrook v. Norfolk 
Southern Ry. Co., 414 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2005); see generally Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, 411 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (in evaluating a summary 
judgment motion, "the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the 
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substantive evidentiary burden....") "The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear 
that it will summarily reverse when this standard has not been applied." Pehowic v. Erie 
Lackawanna R.R., 430 F.2d 697, 699 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970). 
II. When Christiansen Knew Or Should Have Known That His Health 
Problems Are Attributable To Asbestos Is A Question Of Fact Which 
Requires A Trial 
Union Pacific concedes, as it must, that "a cause of action accrues for statute of 
limitations purposes when a reasonably prudent person knows or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known of both the injury and its governing causes." (UP 
Brief at 27, quoting Fries v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092, 1095 
(7th Cir. 1990).13 Union Pacific is not entitled to summary judgment in this case because 
the record is, at best, ambiguous on the issue of when plaintiff Christiansen had sufficient 
knowledge that he had a lung disease caused by asbestos exposure to trigger the running 
of the statute of limitations. 
First, unlike the plaintiffs in many of the cases Union Pacific cites, there is ample 
evidence that Christiansen diligently sought medical help for his lung-related ailments 
when he became aware of them.14 Christiansen describes his long and unsuccessful 
13
 The case law illustrating the proper application of this standard to cases such as 
this is discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, and in keeping with the Court's procedural 
rules, will not be repeated here. Union Pacific's attempt to distinguish them only 
underscores thai application of the discovery rule is a fact-intensive process. 
14
 Compare, e.g., Fries, supra (plaintiff time-barred because he did not seek any 
treatment for his hearing injuries for four years after they began). 
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efforts to obtain a diagnosis and effective relief- starting around the time of his 
retirement in approximately 1995 - as follows: 
And so they'd send me to one doctor, and they'd diagnose me 
with this. And they'd treat me for congestion. And then the 
next one would check me out for lung cancer. And then 
they'd decide, well, didn't have lung cancer. So they'd send 
me to a different one. And they'd run me through cat scans, 
and I've been through so many cat scans and stuff..., and 
them open images, I can't even count them. 
And when they decided they couldn't stop that hurt, they'd 
pawn you off onto another one.... Maybe this, this doctor 
might know more about it. And then you go through all the 
same thing again. 
(Christiansen Depo, Vol 1 at 116:4-19 (R. 578).) Christiansen made it a point to tell the 
doctors he consulted that he'd been exposed to asbestos,15 but was told by his treating 
physician that was not the cause of his problem: 
Q. Can you remember what that doctor told you that he 
thought was a problem? 
A. The first thing they do if there's anything to do with your 
lungs, they think you've got congestion or you've got 
pneumonia or you've got... bronchitis or this - they come up 
with a thousand names. Well, we never even thought of-
never even crossed our mind of asbestos. 
(Christiansen Depo. Vol. 2 at 362:21-363:4 (R. 577).) The "lung doctor" that 
Christiansen subsequently saw also told him, "No ... It ain't asbestos.... It's just 
15
 (Christiansen Depo. Vol. 2 at 364:6-10 (R. 582) ("Q. Do you remember telling 
any doctor that you were exposed to asbestos for years in your work, before you went to 
Dr. Scholand? A, Oh, yeah."); see also 362:2-363:10 (R. 577). 
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congestion." (Id. at 364:16-365:3 (R. 582).) Christiansen cannot be faulted for failing to 
bring suit earlier, in the face of those contrary diagnoses. See, e.g., Aerojet-General 
Shipyards, Inc. v. O'Keeffe, 413 F.2d 793, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1969) (fact that employee "was 
aware of symptoms of his work-related diseases as early as 1964 and that he thought 
perhaps they might be caused or related to his working conditions" did not trigger the 
statute of limitations where "several doctors expressly rejected [plaintiffs] layman self-
diagnosis...."); Young v. Clinchfield Railroad Co., 288 F.2d 499, 504 (4th Cir. 1961) ("A 
medical judgment that eluded the specialist cannot reasonably be expected from the 
plaintiff.") 
Union Pacific is free to argue, at trial, that Christiansen's treating physicians were 
negligent, and should have realized earlier that his ailments were more serious than 
"congestion." The jury may agree; or, they may find that given Christiansen's other 
health issues (obesity, back injuries) and the manner in which his pulmonary dysfunction 
presented, it simply took time to identify his disease. In either case, that evaluation 
cannot be made on this summary record. What is certain at this point is that Christiansen 
did not receive a diagnosis of asbestosis until he consulted Dr.Scholand at University of 
Utah Hospital. (Christiansen Depo. Vol. 1 at 116:20-117:15 (R. 578).) When asked, 
"Was Dr. Scholand the first doctor to tell you it was asbestos?" Christiansen responded 
"Yes." (Id. at 120:9-11 (R. 579). ) He believes this conversation happened "in 2002." 
(Id. at 120:9-15 (R. 581).) 
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Union Pacific asks the Court to disregard that testimony, and to find that 
Christiansen "knew" for years prior to his diagnosis that his symptoms were caused by 
asbestos. It cites Christiansen's testimony regarding his knowledge that asbestos was 
being removed from schools, and his reluctance to bid on costly roofing jobs involving 
asbestos, in the mid-1990s in support of that argument. However, "[t]he statute [of 
limitations] cannot start running when the plaintiff merely knows ... that there is a 
suspected link between a particular substance and cancer in general." Maughan v. SW 
Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985). Rather, he must have objective 
reason to believe that a particular carcinogen caused his cancer. Id. Christiansen's 
testimony that he did not have that information prior to 2002 refutes Union Pacific's 
contention.16 
Appellant's Opening Brief states that, "Almost immediately after Dr. Scholand 
confirmed the asbestosis diagnosis, plaintiff sought counsel and retained them to pursue 
claims for his injuries." (AOB at 6) Given Christiansen's testimony, and the fact that his 
Complaint was filed on January 9, 2002, it now appears that statement may be in error. 
16
 Union Pacific also cites to Christiansen's testimony that he now connects the 
deaths of several of his friends and family to asbestos. However, at the time of his 
deposition in 2003, the witness stated those deaths did not occur until "probably two 
years ago" - only a year prior, or possibly subsequent to, the time the Complaint was 
filed. (Christiansen Depo. Vol.3 at 455:20-456:20 (R. 685-86).) 
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There simply is not enough evidence in the record to determine when, precisely, Dr. 
Scholand was consulted.17 
The evidence that is before the Court is, however, sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case that Christiansen's claims are timely. Christiansen testified that he began to 
harbor suspicions that his problems were due to asbestos "a couple years" before his 
deposition was taken, i.e., in 2001. (Christiansen Depo. Vol. 1 at 120:3-8 (R. 579), Vol. 2 
at 363:6-10 (R. 577).) While the Complaint does not allege a "date of discovery," it does 
allege that Christiansen "was diagnosed with pulmonary fibrosis in 1999." 18 There is no 
evidence that prior to that diagnosis, he knew he had a permanent lung disease (as 
opposed to being sick with bronchitis), much less that he had asbestosis. Compare Fries, 
supra, 909 F.2d 1092 at 1095, quoted in UP Brief at 27 (a cause of action does not accrue 
until "a reasonable person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
known of both the injury and its governing cause" [emph. added]) Assuming for the 
sake of argument that his fibrosis diagnosis, combined with his worsening symptoms, was 
17
 Union Pacific relies on a medical report dated November 27, 2002 (R. 351) for 
the proposition that "the only evidence of record is that Mr. Christiansen saw Dr. 
Scholand for the first time in November 2002." (UP Brief at 19.) That inference is 
incorrect. The report in fact states, "Mr. Christiansen returns to clinic today for followup. 
[emph. added]" It is thus unclear when Christiansen first consulted Scholand. 
18
 Complaint filed 1/9/02, Ex. I (R. 1-12). 
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what put Christiansen on notice as to the origin of his disease, his action was still 
commenced within FELA's three-year statute of limitations.19 
III. The Medical Treatise Appended To Union Pacific's Brief Should Be 
Excluded 
Union Pacific has appended to its Brief selected pages from a text entitled 
"Occupational Lung Disorders" by W. Raymond Parkes. This medical evidence is 
proffered without any accompanying testimony or other indication that it is reliable or 
accepted in the scientific community, nor was it made available to the court below. See 
Utah R. App. Pro. 11(a) (Record on appeal is limited to "[t]he original papers and exhibits 
filed in the trial court.") While Christiansen does not dispute the proposition that 
"asbestosis is not a new disease" for which the treatise is cited, he cannot express 
judgment about the other information it contains. Accordingly, Christiansen objects to 
Union Pacific's injection of this new medical evidence into the Record, and asks that it be 
excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the Court - not disputed in their motion for summary 
judgment - is that Union Pacific required its former employee Christiansen to work with 
asbestos as part of his routine job duties, at a time when the railroad industry in general 
19
 Christiansen recognizes that his apparent filing of the Complaint prior to 
receiving a formal diagnosis is at odds with some of the policy arguments made in his 
Opening Brief. However, Union Pacific can hardly complain that plaintiff filed earlier 
than was necessary, as that is the very position it advocates. 
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and Union Pacific in particular had knowledge of the risks of asbestos exposure, and that 
Christiansen is now suffering from asbestosis. Although he had subjective suspicions that 
asbestos might have been a factor in causing his ailments, Christiansen was unaware he 
had pulmonary fibrosis until 1999, and he was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 2002. 
That record, construed as it must be with any doubts resolved in favor of Christiansen, is 
sufficient to require a jury trial of this case. At that point, and only at that point, can 
Union Pacific's timeliness and foreseeability defenses be properly evaluated. 
As argued in Christiansen's Opening and Reply Briefs, the trial court's decision to 
grant summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds should be reversed because 
there is a material factual dispute between the parties as to when Christiansen knew or 
should have known he was suffering from an asbestos-related disease. However, the trial 
court's admission of Kenneth Cohen's affidavit and its finding that such testimony makes 
out a prima facie case for Union Pacific's breach of duty should not be disturbed. The 
undisputed facts of Christiansen's asbestosis diagnosis, his exposure to asbestos at Union 
Pacific's workplace, and the evidence that the hazards of asbestos became common 
knowledge in the railroad industry some 20 years' prior to Christiansen's employment, 
are more than sufficient to entitle Christiansen to present his claims to a jury. 
For all of the above reasons, Appellant/Cross-Appellee respectfully requests the 
Court: 
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(1) reverse the judgment of the trial court granting Union Pacific's motion for 
summary judgment; 
(2) to affirm the trial court's admission of the Affidavit of Kenneth Cohen and its 
finding that the question whether Union Pacific breached its duty to provide Christiansen 
with a safe working environment should be determined by the jury; 
(3) vacate the trial court's order dismissing Union Pacific from this case; and 
(4) award appellant his costs on this appeal. 
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